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“Most of us spend too much time on the last twenty-four hours and 
too little on the last six thousand years.”1  
–Will Durant 
The sharply contrasting experiences of John G. Roberts, Jr. and 
William Howard Taft with the Article II, Section 2 appointments 
process illustrate that the long view of history is governed by 
perspective. William Howard Taft, the twenty-seventh President, also 
later became the tenth Chief Justice of the United States.2 Taft was 
nominated for the position of Chief Justice of the Supreme Court—a 
position he openly admired—on June 30, 1921, and was confirmed by 
the Senate in a closed executive session the very same day. The 
current Chief Justice, John Roberts, Jr., experienced a more 
peripatetic journey in his ascension to the high court. President 
George H.W. Bush first nominated Justice Roberts to the federal 
bench in 1992.3 Despite his nomination, he never received a hearing 
by the Senate Judiciary Committee,4 which first reviews nominees 
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 1. INTERESTING HISTORY: HISTORY AS YOU WERE NEVER TAUGHT, Historical Quotes, 
https://sites.psu.edu/interestinghistory/2014/04/26/historical-quotes. 
 2. Taft is the only person to serve as both President and Supreme Court Justice.  
 3. Brad Snyder, The Judicial Genealogy (and Mythology) of John Roberts: Clerkships 
from Gray to Brandeis to Friendly to Roberts, 71 OHIO ST. L.J. 1149, 1229 (2010).  
 4. Id. 
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before reporting them out to the Senate for a vote. Roberts was 
nominated a second time a decade later, and again, never received a 
hearing before the Senate Judiciary Committee. His third 
nomination—to the United States Court of Appeals for the District of 
Columbia Circuit, by President George W. Bush in 2003—was the 
charm. That time, Justice Roberts received a hearing, was reported 
out favorably by the Senate Judiciary Committee, and received a 
positive vote by the Senate. Two years later, in 2005, he was 
nominated and confirmed as Chief Justice of the United States 
Supreme Court.5 
Professor Weaver provides his perspective of the Appointments 
Clause filtered by the lens of history. He eloquently argues that the 
Article II, Section 2 process that gives the Senate “advice and 
consent” power over the Executive’s nominations of judges, officers 
of the United States, and ambassadors “wasn’t supposed to be easy.”6 
In fact, he observes that the Senate’s role in the confirmation 
process—likely included because of a basic distrust of government—
sometimes has been “contentious and ideologically driven.”7 
Professor Weaver’s historical review also emphasizes that Judge 
Robert Bork’s failed 1987 nomination to the United States Supreme 
Court was not a watershed moment in the Senate’s consideration of 
ideology in performing its advice and consent function,8 with 
ideological considerations utilized in confirmation proceedings as far 
back as the country’s nascent years in the late 1700s.9 
While I align with Professor Weaver about the Bork proceedings 
and the well-established use of ideology in the appointments process, 
we hold differing perspectives on what the appointments-process 
 
 5. Chief Justice Roberts was originally nominated for the position being vacated by 
Justice Sandra Day O’Connor. After Roberts was nominated, Chief Justice Rehnquist died, and 
President Bush withdrew his initial nomination and nominated Roberts for the vacant Chief 
Justice position. 20 THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES: HEARINGS AND REPORTS 
ON SUCCESSFUL AND UNSUCCESSFUL NOMINATIONS OF SUPREME COURT JUSTICES BY THE 
SENATE JUDICIARY COMMITTEE, 1916–2005, at xix (Roy M. Merskey & Tobe Liebert eds., 
2006).  
 6. Russell L. Weaver, “Advice and Consent” in Historical Perspective, 64 DUKE L.J. 1717, 
1752 (2015).  
 7. Id. at 1753. 
 8. For some commentators, Judge Bork’s seemingly politicized nomination proceeding 
was where the appointments process all started unraveling and where arguably major damage 
was done to the legitimacy of the Advice and Consent function. Neither Professor Weaver nor I 
think that was the case, despite the addition of the term “Borking” into the popular lexicon.  
 9. An example would be the rejected nomination of John Rutledge as Chief Justice of the 
United States Supreme Court in 1795, discussed infra notes 38–41 and accompanying text.  
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history means. Specifically, our divergence extends roughly for 225 
years, with the first difference extending to his sanguinity with the 
Senate’s historical deference to presidential nominees—a deference 
that essentially eschews a responsibility to advise—and the second 
difference concerning his characterization of the current era as only 
digressing from traditional functionality by “a matter of degree rather 
than [representing] a reflection of a fundamental shift in the nature of 
the confirmation process.”10 That assessment improperly conflates “a 
matter of degree” with seismic cultural, technological and political 
changes over the past several decades that have greatly enhanced the 
dysfunction of the appointments process.11 
A central premise of this paper is that the brilliance of the 
Appointments Clause has become obscured by dysfunction past and 
present. The Senate’s deference to the President’s nominees in the 
past was just as damaging to effective government as some of the 
political polarization and obstruction of the current day. In other 
words, the appointments process has changed over time, but not 
necessarily for the worse. Historical rubber-stamping of nominees by 
the Senate, with lightning-fast approval, is not preferable to careful 
and reflective consideration and the opportunity for collaborative 
competency between two branches of government. Yet, today’s new 
appointments process is fraught with peril, from wholesale refusal to 
act in a timely manner12 to staged public hearings designed to reveal 
nothing. Some of these new tactics are inconsistent with the process 
values of the clause and have a far-reaching impact. 
Vacancies in the federal courts, in particular, broadly impact the 
quality of justice in the country.13 With an implied presumption of 
confirmation favoring an executive who nominates with discretion, 
this paper suggests that the Senate ought to provide a robust but 
controlled check on presidential discretion through due diligence and 
individualized public evaluation, while also ensuring that its own rules 
do not get in the way of a timely and effective process. 
 
 10. Weaver, supra note 6, at 1753. 
 11. Essentially, I disagree with Professor Weaver in two respects: I believe the process was 
sometimes circumvented historically by Senate deference and that it is circumvented today by 
wholesale strategies of obstruction.  
 12. See generally, Adam J. White, Toward the Framers’ Understanding of “Advice and 
Consent”: A Historical and Textual Inquiry, 29 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 103 (2005) (examining 
the current trend of delayed appointments). 
 13. See, e.g., Carl W. Tobias, Essay, Postpartisan Federal Judicial Selection, 51 B.C. L. REV. 
769, 770 (2010). 
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This Essay first explores the Clause’s antecedents in the Age of 
Enlightenment and its emergence in the Constitutional Convention in 
1787, showing how its sturdy separation-of-powers foundation was 
built. In Part II, the Essay focuses on the historical realities of the 
Clause’s two-branch process, especially how the operability of two 
political bodies naturally yields results consonant with the etiquette 
and political sensibilities of the day. Then, in Part III, it offers several 
suggestions on how to cabin the potentially untrammeled discretion 
of the Senate in responding to presidential nominations. 
I. THE HISTORICAL MEANING OF “ADVICE AND CONSENT” 
“You know how advice is. You only want it if it agrees with what 
you wanted to do anyway.” 
–John Steinbeck14 
A historical review is helpful in understanding today’s 
appointments process. Professor Weaver divides up his exploration 
into two parts—historical philosophy and historical realities.15 These 
historical markers weave a useful mosaic in highlighting the 
importance of the philosophical origins of the separation of powers, 
and the realities of implementing the Appointments Clause. Yet, 
Professor Weaver understates important points, especially how the 
brilliance of the collaborative, interdependent structure of the 
separation of powers has become overwhelmed by the practical 
imbalance created by unchecked Senate obstructionism. 
A. The Separation of Powers and the Adversarial Process 
Professor Weaver traces the philosophical underpinnings of the 
Constitution to the Age of Enlightenment. He noted that 
philosophers such as Baron de Montesquieu16 contributed to the 
Constitution’s central idea that the legitimacy of governmental power 
is derived from the people, from the bottom up, and not from the top 
down, as with divine right. The Framers also were influenced by 
writers such as Thomas Paine, who asserted that the government 
should be mistrusted regardless of the source of its power.17 These 
 
 14. JOHN STEINBECK, THE WINTER OF OUR DISCONTENT 146 (1961). 
 15. See Weaver, supra note 6, at 1722, 1730.  
 16. Charles-Louis de Secondat was a French lawyer who was born in 1689 and died in 1755. 
 17. See Weaver, supra note 6, at 1723. 
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philosophies, mixed with the pragmatism of the Framers, led to the 
idea of separating powers into different branches of government.18 
While separation of powers was not given an express niche in the 
Constitution, its import is undeniable. Interdependence among the 
branches can be seen in many places in the Constitution, requiring 
more than one branch’s approval for the completion or enactment of 
law. Interdependence is required for treaties, for example, with two-
thirds Senate approval, and in the making of all domestic laws. It is 
also required for impeachment: the House of Representatives 
impeaches, the Senate tries the impeachment, and the Chief Justice of 
the United States Supreme Court presides. 
As Professor Weaver observes, the cooperative intertwining of 
two branches of government in the Appointments Clause is “fully 
consistent” with the larger foundational doctrine of the separation of 
powers, as attributed to Baron de Montesquieu.19 Professor Weaver 
views this fundamental division as intentional inefficiency, but that is 
not the complete story. 
The brilliance of this appointments interdependence elides a 
simple rationale of distrust of government. It pushes beyond the mere 
fact that each branch is elected, or that overlapping duties force 
different factions to engage in a dialogue, if not directly, even to the 
extent of becoming a team of rivals, however begrudgingly. Just 
knowing that there will be examination and inspection ought to be 
enough to modify the behavior of the participants, from the 
Executive who nominates and does not want embarrassment or 
rejection, to the nominees themselves, and to the Senate. 
This structural creation of cooperative competence has other 
advantages. It eliminates the singular viewpoint and its impulsiveness 
and susceptibility to a lack of questioning, and instead values the idea 
of freedom of speech and differing viewpoints—of the Senate and the 
President, at least—and also emulates an adversary system of truth-
seeking. 
The recreation of an adversarial process through a public 
hearing, first established in 1955,20 promotes the Senate’s “advice and 
consent” accountability, especially if the Senate and President are 
 
 18. See id. at 1724–25. 
 19. See id. at 1727. 
 20. See BETSY PALMER, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL31948, EVOLUTION OF THE 
SENATE’S ROLE IN THE NOMINATION AND CONFIRMATION PROCESS: A BRIEF HISTORY 8 
(2009). 
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from different parties. Public hearings eliminate the shadow of 
secrecy and the obvious pale of cronyism, where exposure of bias and 
corruption is more likely to occur than if a confirmation was based on 
only a unilateral nomination and approval by the same branch. 
In addition, the hearing mechanism by itself creates at least a 
path to transparency, if not to the truth. The concept of scientific 
truth means negating hypotheses through experiment and replication 
to arrive at what is fact. The idea of evidentiary truth, by contrast, 
means to test propositions through the adversarial process. The 
adversarial process boasts the use of cross-examination, a tool the 
commentator John H. Wigmore called “the greatest legal engine ever 
invented for the discovery of truth.”21 By including Senate hearings as 
a part of “advice and consent,” opponents can make their case with 
an alternate narrative about the nominee. As the stakes grow larger, 
so does the intensity of the evaluation, which can be seen in the fact 
that three nominees to become Chief Justice of the Supreme Court 
have been rejected.22 One example is the failed nomination of Justice 
Abe Fortas to the position of Chief Justice, which yielded this 
exchange between North Carolina Senator Sam Ervin and Justice 
Fortas during the nominee’s Senate committee hearing: 
Senator Ervin: But if the Constitution says one thing, and the 
Justices do not like what the Constitution says, they are certainly not 
at liberty to change the meaning, are they? 
Justice Fortas: Absolutely not. Of course not. That would be a 
violation of their oath.”23 
The adversarial confirmation process borrows some of its fact-
finding and truth-telling mechanisms from the legal system. Within an 
adversarial context, the Bork confirmation hearing in some sense was 
a success. It involved a public vetting of a nominee whose views were 
stated and debated. It became clear that the consent standard was not 
simply about minimum qualifications, but rather about broader 
political “balance” questions as well. 
 
 21. Lilly v. Virginia, 527 U.S. 116, 214 (1999) (quoting John H. Wigmore). 
 22. See generally Joseph Larisa, Jr., Popular Mythology: The Framers’ Intent, the 
Constitution, and Ideological Review of Supreme Court Nominees, 30 B.C. L. REV. 969 (1989) 
(documenting the rejection of Supreme Court nominees). 
 23. 9 THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES: HEARINGS AND REPORTS ON 
SUCCESSFUL AND UNSUCCESSFUL NOMINATIONS OF SUPREME COURT JUSTICES BY THE 
SENATE JUDICIARY COMMITTEE, 1916–1972, at 113 (Roy Merskey & J. Myron Jacobstein eds., 
1975). 
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B. The Narrative of the Constitutional Convention: The Value of the 
Framers’ Intent 
Perhaps more than any source other than the text itself, the 
Constitutional Convention of 1787 affords insight into the decision to 
split the appointments power between two branches. It is not just 
what the Framers did with appointments that matters—but also what 
they chose not to do. 
In briefly describing the Convention’s relevance, Professor 
Weaver explains that the Framers were not “in complete agreement 
regarding the need to ‘check’ and ‘balance’ the President’s 
appointments power.”24 This observation is a considerable 
understatement, and it misses a significant opportunity to provide 
further texture to the meaning of the “advice and consent” mandate. 
The narrative of the Appointments Clause at the Convention was far 
from quotidian;25 it appeared to be more like a pinball in an arcade 
game than a ship’s anchor. There were more than enough positions to 
go around, and some influential individual framers, such as James 
Madison, even modified their own initial positions. 
The initial proposal at the Convention placed the appointment of 
federal judges solely in the hands of the Congress, with “a National 
Judiciary” to be selected “by the National Legislature.”26 This 
proposal was rejected as too unwieldy, leading to alternate 
suggestions.27 Representative James Wilson of Pennsylvania, for 
example, suggested that the Executive be given sole power over 
judicial appointments, but that was rejected as well. Soon thereafter, 
in late July of 1787, a proposal giving the Senate exclusive control 
over judicial nominations received a favorable vote. The exclusivity of 
senatorial control, which was supported by James Madison, father of 
the Virginia Plan, was also vocally opposed by George Mason of 
Virginia; the Appointments Clause was subsequently grouped with 
other problematic items to be considered by the Committee on 
Postponed Matters. That Committee issued a report in early 
 
 24. Weaver, supra note 6, at 1730. 
 25. Of course, the original thirteen colonies were also split on how to select judges, with 
eight states implementing solely legislative selection and five states utilizing executive selection. 
Larry C. Berkson, Judicial Selection in the United States: A Special Report, 64 JUDICATURE 176, 
176 n.1 (1980).  
 26. JAMES MADISON, NOTES OF DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787 (1966); 
see Larisa, supra note 22, at 973.  
 27. See, e.g., Larisa, supra note 22, at 973. 
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September, sharing the power of appointments for the first time with 
the Executive; that is where it ended up. 
The convoluted twists and turns of the appointments provision at 
the Convention reveal the lack of a single shared Framers’ vision of 
the Appointments Clause.28 As one commentator summarized the 
wildly divergent ideas advanced by various Framers: 
The Convention also considered having the legislature nominate, 
the Senate nominate, the President nominate, the President 
nominate with the concurrence of one-third of the Senate, and the 
Senate nominate subject to the approval of the President.29 
The lack of cohesion among the Framers allowed commentators, 
such as then-professor Walter Dellinger, and various politicians, 
including then-Senator and member of the Judiciary Committee, 
Joseph Biden, to declare that the Framers intended ideological review 
of nominees by the Senate.30 The strongly divided approaches 
indicate, if nothing else, that the Framers did not trust placing these 
important decisions wholly within one branch of government. Viewed 
from a positive perspective, the divided placement also creates a 
robust constitutional balance between political entities.31 While the 
various representatives were cognizant that the appointments would 
be initiated and approved by politicians, they clearly wanted to check 
unexamined and unfettered appointments. 
 
 28. See id. at 978–79 (finding that “the Convention as a whole was very much undecided on 
the proper method of appointment until its unanimous decision in September to place it in the 
hands of the president”). 
 29. Id. at 978 n.36 (citing JAMES MADISON, NOTES OF DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL 
CONVENTION OF 1787, 345 (1968) (remarks of O. Ellsworth)).  
 30. Then-Senator Biden, of Delaware, was the Chair of the Senate Judiciary Committee, 
which held the nomination hearings. The Convention, when added to Alexander Hamilton’s 
views expressed in Federalist No. 77, led Biden to think the consideration of ideology was 
“beyond dispute from an historical perspective.” 133 CONG. REC. 22,796 (1987) (statement of 
Sen. Biden); see also Walter Dellinger, Choosing Judges, The Framers’ Intent, 132 CONG. REC. 
22,796 (1986) (statement of Sen. Biden) (eschewing political philosophy is “simply inconsistent 
with both the text and original intent of the appointments clause”); Charles A. Black Jr., A Note 
on Senatorial Consideration of Supreme Court Nominees, 79 YALE L.J. 657, 660 (1970) (arguing 
that the Constitution “permits, if it does not compel,” political considerations by the Senate). 
 31. Commentators often referred to the Federalist Papers to divine the Framers’ intent. 
See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST NO. 76 (Alexander Hamilton) (advancing the Senate’s role as an 
“excellent check upon the spirit of favouritism in the President”); Larisa, supra note 22, at 980 
(quoting same). 
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II. THE HISTORICAL REALITIES OF THE APPOINTMENTS PROCESS 
Professor Weaver’s review of the historical realities of the 
confirmation process provides additional insights. The history offers 
precedent with which to contrast today’s political gridlock. 
For much of the nation’s history, confirmation controversies 
were few.32 Professor Weaver asserts that, generally, the Senate has 
been “relatively deferential” to the President’s nominations, 
especially in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries.33 For example, 
Professor Weaver notes that the Senate has rejected only fifteen 
cabinet-level nominees and thirty-six Supreme Court nominees.34 
This level of approval of nominees might reflect functionality, 
but it also masks the failings of a process that lacked public and 
robust debate, making it easier for presidents to nominate non-
diverse candidates35 chosen by patronage rather than merit. For many 
years, nominees were approved within days of their nomination—
sometimes even on the same day.36 This lightning-fast approval 
process raises questions about the nature and scope of due diligence. 
Presidents may, in fact, need to be saved from themselves. As 
President Dwight Eisenhower once said, “I made two mistakes and 
both of them are sitting on the Supreme Court.”37 
 
 32. Richard Lugar, Address to the Seventh Circuit Bar Association and the Seventh Circuit 
Judicial Conference Annual Joint Meeting May 6, 2013, 47 IND. L. REV. 787, 787–88 (2014). 
 33. Weaver, supra note 6, at 1730. 
 34. Id. at 1730–31. This disparity is perhaps explained, at least in part, by the difference in 
the confirmation of cabinet officers and federal judges. Federal judges are appointed for life, 
unless they are impeached or voluntarily resign, unlike political officers, who generally hold 
office at the pleasure of the president, a much more transitory tenure in comparison. Senatorial 
review, therefore, takes on even greater meaning when it involves a likely lifetime appointment.  
 35. John Schwartz, For Obama, A Record on Diversity But Delays on Judicial 
Confirmations, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 7, 2011, at A17 (“The federal judiciary is growing more 
diverse. President Obama has nominated a higher percentage of female, minority and gay 
judges than any previous president.”). As of 2011, 47 percent of confirmed judges who were 
nominated by President Obama and confirmed by the Senate were women, compared to 23 
percent for President G. W. Bush, and 29 percent for President Clinton. Additionally, 21 
percent of the judges nominated and confirmed during the Obama administration were African 
Americans, with just 7 percent during the Bush presidency and 16 percent during the Clinton 
presidency. Id. 
 36. One prominent example, discussed above, involved Chief Justice William Howard Taft. 
 37. Eisenhower was referring to Justices Earl Warren and William Brennan, Jr. Lewis M. 
Wasserman, & James C. Hardy, U.S. Supreme Court Justices’ Religious and Party Affiliation, 
Case-Level Factors, Decisional Era and Voting in Establishment Clause Disputes Involving 
Public Education: 1947–2012, 2 BRIT. J. AM. LEGAL STUD. 111, 155 n.149 (2013). Note, 
however, that there is some question as to whether Eisenhower actually uttered this line. See, 
e.g., Theo Lippman, Jr., Anecdotes are Dangerous to Biographers and Truth Mistakes: When 
FRIEDLAND IN PP (DO NOT DELETE) 5/15/2015  2:26 AM 
182 DUKE LAW JOURNAL ONLINE [Vol. 64:173 
While approval without much advice was the historical norm, 
there were occasional ripples of rejection—even based on ideology—
that provided precedent for the politicized Bork hearing. The 
consideration of ideology often occurred within the context of party 
politics, particularly for judges. This context sometimes framed 
nominations to the extent that the inflection points overwhelmed 
objective assessment. Perhaps the best illustration of how politics 
played a role in early confirmation proceedings was the Senate’s 
refusal to confirm John Rutledge as Chief Justice of the United 
States.38 President George Washington nominated Rutledge for the 
position on July 1, 1795.39 Rutledge had been previously nominated by 
Washington as a Justice and confirmed, but he subsequently resigned 
to become the Chief Justice in his home state, South Carolina. Before 
his second confirmation process, however, Rutledge initiated a 
political firestorm by giving a public speech opposing the 
controversial Jay Treaty with England,40 which was strongly 
supported by the Federalists, who happened to make up a large part 
of the Senate. The speech created a “sensation.”41 Having sparked the 
ire of the Federalists, Rutledge’s second nomination was defeated. 
A. Partisan Politics 
The polarized politics of the past decade have left an indelible 
mark on the Appointments Clause. An exchange during an oral 
argument before the Supreme Court illustrates the effect of 
politicization during the last two decades. During the 2012 argument 
of National Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius,42 which 
involved a challenge to the Patient Protection and Affordable Care 
Act, one of the advocates argued that even if part of the law were 
found unconstitutional, severability would be appropriate because 
 
Essential Little Details are Distorted Vast Damage is Done, THE BALTIMORE SUN (Sept. 7, 
1997), available at http://articles.baltimoresun.com/1997-09-07/news/1997250003_1_brennan-
eisenhower-eisler. 
 38. See Larisa, supra note 22, at 975–76. But see id. at 982 (arguing that Rutledge was not 
rejected for ideological reasons). 
 39. Id. at 976.  
 40. J. MYRON JACOBSTEIN AND ROY M. MERSKY, THE REJECTED: SKETCHES OF THE 26 
MEN NOMINATED FOR THE SUPREME COURT BUT NOT CONFIRMED BY THE SENATE 8 (1993). 
It was not known whether Rutledge was aware of his nomination at the time of the speech. 
Communications in those days “were very slow; there were no telephones, telegraphs, or fax 
machines.” Id. 
 41. Id. 
 42. Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012). 
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Congress would have desired to keep some of the provisions intact.43 
Justice Kennedy responded to the advocate’s claim by asking, “[T]he 
real Congress or a hypothetical Congress?”44 This reply might be 
humorous coming from the mouth of a Supreme Court justice—and 
actually drew laughter at the time45—if not for the fact that the 
underlying premise was widely recognized as true. 
The delay of nominations by both parties, sometimes for years 
after hearings,46 lends credibility to Justice Kennedy’s reply. The 
process for many appointees has slowed considerably, leading one 
commentator to write in 2010, “The data indicate that the entire 
nomination-and-confirmation process (from when the President first 
learned of a vacancy to final Senate action) has generally taken 
almost twice as long for nominees after 1980 than for nominees in the 
previous eighty years.”47 Judge William A. Fletcher, for example, was 
first nominated to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals in April of 
1995. He had his first hearing in December of 1995 and was favorably 
reported out to the Senate in May 1996.48 The Senate of the 104th 
Congress did not take a vote on the report, and the nomination died. 
In January of 1997, he was re-nominated. A second hearing was held 
in April of 1998. He was reported out favorably in May of 1998. 
Finally, in October of 1998, he was confirmed.49 His multiple 
nomination history without Senate votes was shared by several well-
known judges and officials.50 
Delays have not just affected the nominees and served as a 
political back-and-forth; they have had direct impacts on judicial and 
governmental operability. With substantial vacancies51 in the courts, 
 
 43. Transcript of Oral Argument at 78–79, Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 
2566 (2012) (Nos. 11-393, 11-400). 
 44. Id. at 79. 
 45. Justice Kennedy’s question did, in fact, evoke laughter. Id.  
 46. See Sheldon Goldman, A Simple Index Offers a Simple New Way to Measure 
Objectively the Phenomenon of Obstruction and Delay in Confirming Federal Judges, 86 
JUDICATURE 251, 251 (2003) (discussing nominees who waited more than one year between 
nomination and confirmation).  
 47. R. SAM GARRETT & DENIS STEVEN RUTKUS, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL33118, 
SPEED OF PRESIDENTIAL AND SENATE ACTIONS ON SUPREME COURT NOMINATIONS, 1900-
2010, SUMMARY (2010).  
 48. Goldman, supra note 46, at 251. 
 49. Id. 
 50. Chief Justice John Roberts, for example, was nominated three times before he was 
voted upon and confirmed by the Senate. 
 51. White, supra note 12, at 107 (noting that in order to clear vacancies, several 
commentators offered solutions based on their interpretations of the Constitution. Some law 
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for example, burgeoning caseloads and needy litigants have taken a 
back seat to partisan politics.52 
The political polarity of the present times has had a ripple effect 
on the branches of government, ranging from partisan statutory 
overrides of the Supreme Court53 to government shutdown.54 It is not 
hard to imagine a slippery slope where a contrarian Senate decides to 
oppose or unduly delay all of the President’s nominations for the 
federal courts and officers, or, conversely, to imagine a President who 
refuses to nominate candidates primarily because they will be 
disapproved or held up indefinitely. While these scenarios are easier 
to visualize between a Senate and President of opposing political 
parties, this also could occur with differing factions within the same 
party.55 Would the Senate and President be faithfully discharging their 
duties if each collaborator took a lack of good-faith participation to 
an extreme? Would Antonin Scalia, nominated to the Supreme Court 
in 1986 by President Reagan and confirmed by a Senate vote of 98-0, 
have received a remotely similar vote?56 These and other questions 
raise pragmatic concerns about which strategies are legitimate and 
which ones are constitutional outliers. 
While Professor Weaver is undoubtedly correct in saying that the 
current appointment process’s ills were not caused by the Bork 
 
professors and even President George W. Bush, for example, argued that the Senate was 
constitutionally obligated to vote on nominees). 
 52. See, e.g., Tobias, supra note 13, at 769–72. 
 53. One commentator noted, “[W]e see a new, but rarer, phenomenon—partisan 
overriding—that appears to require conditions of near-unified control of both branches of 
Congress and the presidency. Two recent examples are (1) the Military Commissions Act of 
2006, in which Republicans overturned the Court’s statutory interpretation decision in Hamdan 
v. Rumsfeld on the habeas corpus rights of enemy combatants, and (2) the Lilly Ledbetter Fair 
Pay Act of 2009, in which Democrats overturned the Court’s statutory interpretation decision in 
Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co.” Richard L. Hasen, End of the Dialogue? Political 
Polarization, the Supreme Court and Congress, 86 S.C. L. REV. 205, 209 (2013). 
 54. The term government “shutdown” really refers to a funding gap, where appropriations 
are not made for continued government operations. The last such shutdown occurred in 2013, 
from October 1 to October 16.  
 55. One example is President George W. Bush’s nomination of Harriet Miers to the 
Supreme Court. As one commentator stated, “A Democrat had recommended her. Republicans 
had opposed her. . . . [Her nomination] caused political chaos . . . .” JAN CRAWFORD 
GREENBURG, SUPREME CONFLICT: THE INSIDE STORY OF THE STRUGGLE FOR CONTROL OF 
THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT 300 (2007).  
 56. Furthermore, would it have been legitimate for him to not have been reported out of 
the Judiciary Committee or otherwise received a negative vote? See generally, e.g., Lee Epstein, 
Rene Lindstadt, Jeffrey A. Segal & Chad Westerland, The Changing Dynamics of Senate Voting 
on Supreme Court Nominees, 68 J. OF POLITICS 296 (2006). 
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nomination proceedings,57 the Framers’ vision of a shared and 
collaborative constitutional process has been substantially disrupted 
in the post-Bork hearing era58 and is in need of repair.59 This 
disruption is a mainstream perception today, if not the reality. Many 
see the federal political system overall—of which the appointments 
process is merely a part—as gridlocked, if not broken. The approval 
ratings of Congress and even the Supreme Court have sunk to 
precipitous depths.60 The current perceptions find no refuge in 
history, despite Professor Weaver’s optimism. 
B. The Downstream Dangers of Partisanship 
Of the lessons learned from these historical realities, the most 
important one (overlooked by Professor Weaver) is the danger of 
political partisanship on several levels.61 This danger adversely 
impacts not only the electorate, but also the nominees themselves. 
For judges who survive partisan wrangling, there is arguably more 
temptation to be partisan as well. As former U.S. Senator Richard 
Lugar has noted, “If nominating and confirming judges becomes a 
purely partisan affair, it will be far more likely that judges subjected 
to such proceedings will feel less inclined to uphold strict norms of 
impartiality and non-partisanship.”62 As expectations grow that 
partisan civilians will become partisan judges and officials, pressures 
to fill specific roles increase accordingly.63 In addition, the 
 
 57. It is clear, however, that the Bork proceedings contributed to the increasing 
politicization of the process. 
 58. The issues are most heavily pronounced in cases not just relating to Supreme Court 
nominations, but to lower federal court nominations as well. “That emphasis could be a 
consequence of any number of factors: growing interest group attention to these nominations, 
the lack of vacancies on the Supreme Court in recent years, the increasing tendency of 
presidents to select high court justices from the circuits, violations of long-standing norms on the 
part of contemporary senators (and presidents), or simply the growing importance of the courts 
of appeals.” LEE EPSTEIN & JEFFREY A. SEGAL, ADVICE AND CONSENT: THE POLITICS OF 
JUDICIAL APPOINTMENTS 5 (2005). 
 59. In a regime of checks and balances, both the strength and the weakness is its forced 
collaboration; it is necessary for all participants in the decision-making process to participate 
properly and fully. If not, such a system is particularly susceptible to gridlock.  
 60. See, e.g., Hasen, supra note 53, at 207 (“A 5-4 party split in the health care case 
threatened the legitimacy of the Supreme Court, which had already begun to see an 
unprecedented decline in popularity among the public.”). 
 61. See, e.g., Lugar, supra note 32, at 790.  
 62. Id. 
 63. This expression of displeasure extends to the judiciary as well. Chief Justice John 
Roberts likely generated disappointment in the Supreme Court’s healthcare law decision in 
National Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012), after siding with 
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partisanship of the Senate hearings likely reflects the lack of a true 
dialogue in other parts of the political process, providing a barometer 
for the state of our democracy.64 
This lack of a dialogue, or even of any respectful discourse, likely 
also impacts the delays facing nominees.65 Excessive delays can be as 
harmful as a denial, placing lives on hold and having ripple effects 
into connected government operations. This is now seen in federal 
district court and courts of appeals nominations, where what were 
once same-day approvals now often stretch for several months.66 At 
one point there were fifty-nine unfilled executive branch positions 
with waiting nominees and seventeen vacant judgeships with waiting 
nominees.67 Today, there are forty-five federal judgeship vacancies 
with only ten nominees to fill them,68 indicating that political 
polarization perhaps makes the president reluctant to nominate, 
potential nominees reluctant to accept, and the Senate reluctant to 
expeditiously advise and consent. 
C. The Senate’s Traditions and Procedural Rules 
The potential roadblocks created by some of the Senate’s own 
practices relating to the appointments process provide an additional 
layer of political partisanship. In another understatement, Professor 
Weaver asserts that these rules “can slow or obstruct the presidential 
confirmation process.”69 While Professor Weaver discusses the 
filibuster rule that, until it was modified, caused the appointment of 
ambassadors and senior state department officials to “languish”70 
without cloture, other practices weigh heavily on a smooth and robust 
 
the four Democrat-appointed justices to form a five-justice majority. Hasen, supra note 53, at 
205. 
 64. “If the Senate routinely treats judicial nominees as objects to be exploited for political 
advantage, hopes for bipartisan unity and productivity throughout our democracy would be 
much dimmer.” Id.  
 65. See, e.g., White, supra note 12, at 107. 
 66. Lauren C. Bell, Federal Judicial Selection In History and Scholarship, 96 JUDICATURE 
296, 296 (2013); Sheldon Goldman, A Simple Index Offers a Simple New Way to Measure 
Objectively the Phenomenon of Obstruction and Delay in Confirming Federal Judges, 86 
JUDICATURE 251, 252 (2003). 
 67. See Weaver, supra note 6, at 1719. 
 68. See Current Judicial Vacancies, UNITED STATES COURTS, 
http://www.uscourts.gov/JudgesAndJudgeships/JudicialVacancies/CurrentJudicialVacancies.
aspx, (last visited Feb. 1, 2015).  
 69. Weaver, supra note 6, at 1738. 
 70. Id. at 1739. 
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process as well.71 These guidelines have favored long-standing 
traditions as well as formal rules. 
One tradition is called “blue-slipping,” a form of senatorial 
courtesy. This informal practice can be traced back to 191772 and is 
used only by the Senate Judiciary Committee—not by other Senate 
committees.73 It allows the senators of the nominee’s home state to 
essentially veto a nomination by not returning a blue piece of paper 
indicating approval.74 The blue slip has been lauded as another layer 
of scrutiny in the role of advisor, but also roundly criticized as a 
political, not a professional, safeguard.75 Another tradition involves 
“holds,” where senators can block or delay a nomination by asking 
for such a hold from a party leader.76 While holds are primarily delay 
tactics, they can also terminate a nomination. 
III. LIMITS ON THE SENATE GOING FORWARD: 
IMPLICIT CHECKS AND BALANCES? 
There are no substantive limits77 to the exercise of the Senate’s 
advice and consent powers, either stated or implied.78 While Professor 
Weaver looks at the system as intentionally inefficient, it has become 
unintentionally ineffective as well. The following checks show that 
unofficial limits—based on politics, tradition and culture, as well as 
 
 71. Id. at 1739–40. 
 72. See PALMER, supra note 20, at 8 (citing National Archives and Records 
Administration, Record Group 46, Records of the U.S. Senate, 65th Cong., Records of 
Executive Proceedings, Nomination Files, Judiciary Committee, Robert P. Steward, Blue Slip 
(1917)).  
 73. Id. It became firmly entrenched. Senator James O. Eastland (D-MS), for example, the 
chair of the Senate Judiciary Committee from 1956-1978, would not move a candidate out of 
committee if he did not receive two blue slips from the home state senators endorsing the 
judicial nominees in question. Id. 
 74. Id. at 8. 
 75. Id. at 8 (citing a statement by Senator Paul Laxalt (R-NY) in 1979, calling the blue slip, 
“effective scrutiny,” and a statement by Professor Jonathan Turley criticizing the opportunity 
for senators to block nominations for “nefarious or arbitrary” reasons.).  
 76. Id. at 9. 
 77. The ultimate limit involves exercise of the franchise. The public can vote senators out 
of office if their performance is not deemed acceptable 
 78. Of course, the interpretation of what the terms “advice” and “consent” mean ordinarily 
falls within the auspices of the judiciary, as final arbiters of the meaning of the Constitution. See 
Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803). 
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the rule of law—can evolve to promote an effective appointments 
process.79 
A. Presidential Concessions 
The Senate plays a purely reactive role under the Clause, with no 
input as to who is nominated. The focus on restraining the Senate, 
however, should not be exclusive. The President can be proactive in 
defusing political confrontations, offering an olive branch of sorts, by 
agreeing to the recommendations of independent, bipartisan 
nominating groups. President Jimmy Carter, for example, instituted 
judicial nominating commissions80 to assist with the nomination of 
federal judges. This up-front concession puts added pressure on the 
Senate to match the president—or at least have a greater justification 
for rejecting or holding in abeyance nominations. 
B. Presidential Recess and Vacancy Appointments 
The Recess Appointments Clause of the Constitution has given 
many presidents the opportunity to give their own nominees 
“tryouts” through temporary appointment during a congressional 
recess. Several famous civil servants, including Justice Thurgood 
Marshall,81 were given the chance to serve in this manner. While the 
Supreme Court’s decision in National Labor Relations Board v. Noel 
Canning82 cut back this presidential appointment power to situations 
where congressional recesses occurring at the end of a session last at 
least ten days, it still affords a president the opportunity to fill in gaps 
and provide an on-the-job interview for permanent positions. 
The Federal Vacancies Reform Act of 199883 provides a similar 
presidential outlet to fill in gaps in the operation of government. 
Under this law, the president is given the power to fill positions with 
individuals who serve in an “acting capacity.”84 While this is another 
stopgap measure, it promotes government operability over politics. 
 
 79. This is not entirely surprising: when a constitutional process operates entirely within 
the political system, it will have political limits, if nothing else.  
 80. The American Bar Association ranking of candidates offers a similar objective 
perspective on nominees.  
 81. Bill Mears, Justices Rule for Congress in White House Fight Over Recess Appointments, 
CNN (June 26, 2014), http://www.cnn.com/2014/06/26/justice/supreme-court-recess-
appointments/index.html. 
 82. NLRB v. Noel Canning, 134 S.Ct. 2550 (2014).  
 83. Federal Vacancies Reform Act of 1998, 5 U.S.C. §§ 3345–3349d (2012).   
 84. Id. 
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C. The Senate’s Rules 
The Senate’s rules and customs have had a mixed impact over 
time, but can be a significant source of processes that limit 
obstruction and inaction.85 One such obstructionist tool is the 
filibuster. This strategy uses lengthy speeches to delay congressional 
votes. The filibuster not only pushes back a vote on a particular 
matter, but also serves to delay productive Senate action on other 
matters as well.86 Filibusters have been used to stall nominations for 
well over a century.87 Yet, the Senate recognized the dangers of 
unrestrained filibustering in the early twentieth century and added its 
first cloture rule to end debate (and filibusters) in 1917.88 Today, the 
Senate has limited filibusters on all nominees, save those nominations 
for the Supreme Court.89 
In 1929, the Senate also generally opened its actions to the public 
on the confirmation of nominations, a change from its previously 
closed executive sessions.90 The addition of nominee hearings and the 
creation of a Judiciary Committee staff that investigates candidates 
were both positive modifications to the process that occurred within 
the past sixty years.91 
The creation of a hearing step in the process also has had various 
ramifications. While a hearing permits the nominee to argue his or 
her position and assuage skeptical senators, it also could become an 
additional obstacle. If a nominee did not get a hearing, for example, 
the Senate would not take any action, causing some nominations to 
languish unless the candidates were re-nominated. As noted earlier, 
Chief Justice Roberts was initially nominated by President George H. 
W. Bush to become a judge on the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 
District of Columbia Circuit. Because Roberts did not receive a 
hearing, his nomination was effectively ended. 
 
 85. One Senate procedural rule that can be seen as streamlining the process, for example, 
is the practice of first sending nominations to the Senate Judiciary Committee for a vote. 
 86. PALMER, supra note 20, at 10. 
 87. Id. 
 88. Id. 
 89. Jeremy W. Peters, In Landmark Vote, Senate Limits Use of Filibuster, N.Y. TIMES 
(Nov. 21, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/11/22/us/politics/reid-sets-in-motion-steps-to-
limit-use-of-filibuster.html?_r=0. 
 90. Id. 
 91. LEE EPSTEIN & JEFFREY A. SEGAL, ADVICE AND CONSENT: THE POLITICS OF 
JUDICIAL APPOINTMENTS 88 (2005). 
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D. Legislation 
The Senate’s own recognition of the impact of these rules has 
been evidenced by several changes it made in recent years. The 
Presidential Appointment Efficiency and Streamlining Act of 2011, 
for example, which took effect in 2012, attempted to streamline the 
framework by expediting the confirmation process for dozens of 
nominees. The Act also established a working group to look carefully 
at the functionality of the appointments process.92 These and other 
rule changes will be important to the future operability of the 
appointments process. 
E. Public Pressure 
In today’s volatile environment, considerations such as mutating 
political cultures, advances in social media, and globalization can 
significantly impact the appointments process. In particular, the 
current appointments process is very public in a way never seen 
before, primarily as a result of advancing technology and tools such as 
the Internet, Twitter, and other forms of microbroadcasting. Media 
scrutiny often starts even before an official nomination occurs. The 
new public nature is generally a positive development, bringing the 
appointments process to people across the country in considerable 
numbers. In some ways, the expanded scrutiny has generated more 
dialogue and transparency. Prior to 1955, for example, nominees 
usually did not testify before the Senate Judiciary Committee. Now 
such testimony is routine. 
On the other hand, the public pressure can play a distorting role. 
The glare of the multimedia spotlights puts new pressures on the 
Senate to perform as if on stage. With the 24/7 news cycle, the 
nominee’s every word is dissected and re-analyzed. “Public hearings” 
become more than a confirmation process, turning into a media 
event. The Supreme Court nominees become well-known 
personalities within the popular culture.93 An illustration of the 
intensity that can develop surrounding nominations involved an 
earlier statement by Justice Sonia Sotomayor closely examined at her 
 
 92. MAEVE P. CAREY, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R41872, PRESIDENTIAL APPOINTMENTS, 
THE SENATE’S CONFIRMATION PROCESS, AND CHANGES MADE IN THE 112TH CONGRESS 1–3 
(2012). 
 93. For example, Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg has a website devoted to her that is titled 
“Notorious RBG.” See NOTORIOUS R.B.G., http://notoriousrbg.tumblr.com (last visited Mar. 
26, 2015).  
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confirmation hearing.94 In a prior speech, Justice Sotomayor had 
commented about her Latina heritage.95 This not only drew the 
attention of the Senators, but the media as well.96 
Consequently, responsive strategies have made the public 
hearings more like Kabuki theater than a spontaneous give-and-take. 
Nominees have learned to reveal their views and philosophies as little 
as possible in order to avoid social media’s insatiable desire for 
“sound bites” and pithy phrases. As one professor wrote about the 
confirmation hearings of then-judges Ruth Bader Ginsburg and 
Stephen Breyer, “both nominees felt free to decline to disclose their 
views on controversial issues and cases. They stonewalled the 
Judiciary Committee to great effect, as senators greeted their 
‘nonanswer’ answers with equanimity and resigned good humor.”97 
This professor was Elena Kagan,98 who, of course, followed the same 
script during her own Senate confirmation hearing when she was 
nominated to the Supreme Court.99 
CONCLUSION 
The essential constitutional framework involving interdependent 
branches of government is reflected in the Appointments Clause and 
its “Advice and Consent” requirement. The President has the initial 
opportunity to nominate with discretion, but the Senate has the final 
say and can check presidential discretion with scrutiny of its own. 
Professor Weaver provides a useful historical review, showing 
how the seeds of the Appointments Clause emanated from the 
Enlightenment philosophers well before our Constitutional 
Convention erected the separation-of-powers structure. Both 
Professor Weaver and I agree that the structure was indeed a 
 
 94. Carolina A. Miranda, Just What is a ‘Wise Latina,’ Anyway?, TIME (Jul. 14, 2009), 
http://content.time.com/time/politics/article/0,8599,1910403,00.html; Charlie Savage, A Judge’s 
View of Judging Is on the Record, N.Y. Times (May 14, 2009), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/05/15/us/15judge.html. 
 95. Savage, supra note 94. 
 96. Id. 
 97. Elena Kagan, Confirmation Messes, Old and New, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 919, 920 (1995). 
 98. Before becoming a Supreme Court justice, Kagan was the Dean at Harvard Law 
School. 
 99. On August 5, 2010, Justice Kagan was confirmed by the Senate to succeed Justice John 
Paul Stevens. She was sworn in on August 7, 2010. See THE OYEZ PROJECT, 
http://www.oyez.org/justices/elena_kagan (last visited Mar. 26, 2015). 
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masterstroke100 that has withstood the test of time, despite being, in 
his view, intentionally inefficient. 
Although I respect Professor Weaver’s historical mosaic, I do not 
share the conclusions he draws in two respects. First, the 
appointments process has changed over time, but not necessarily for 
the worse. Professor Weaver fails to hold the Senate accountable for 
its long history of deference to presidential discretion. At times, this 
deference has bordered on a “rubber stamping” of approval of 
nominees, as exemplified by the same-day confirmation of William 
Howard Taft as Chief Justice of the Supreme Court. The downstream 
consequences of less Senate oversight could well have been less 
effective government. 
Second, the real danger today from political polarization is not 
the use of ideology in reviewing nominees, but rather the widespread 
seepage of poison from partisanship, which produces wholesale 
strategies of obstruction and a plethora of vacancies. These vacancies, 
particularly for judgeships in the federal courts, have a significant 
impact on the operability of the government and justice system. 
While Professor Weaver does not believe a fundamental shift in 
the process has occurred,101 the gridlock from political partisanship 
shows no signs of abating. Further, the impact of social media and the 
24/7 news cycle on the process cannot be overstated. The process is 
more public than ever—but also more staged as well. Recent 
nomination proceedings appear to be less about the truth than about 
managing public perceptions. 
Despite an apparent fundamental shift in the appointments 
process, there is hope. Through well-grounded “in-house” Senate 
rules, legislation designed to streamline the process, and senators and 
an Executive who take a long view, the fundamental shift that has 
occurred can be for the better. 
 
 
 100. The fact that “advice and consent” was inserted into the Constitution near the end of 
the Constitutional Convention after consideration of many alternative formulations was either a 
masterstroke of genius—or luck. 
 101. Weaver, supra note 6, at 1753. 
